First set of students graduate on University of Sussex’s LLM in Corruption, Law and Governance in Doha, Qatar

Prof Dan Hough proudly reports on the first set of students to graduate from the University of Sussex’s LLM in Corruption, Law and Governance in Doha, Qatar

The University of Sussex is based in the tranquil settings of the South Downs in the UK, faculty members and students nonetheless are acutely aware that many of the problems that get discussed there are global in nature and scope.  That is nowhere more evident than in the international fight against corruption.

The University of Sussex, via the Sussex Centre for the Study of Corruption(SCSC), has developed an impressive portfolio of undergraduate, postgraduate study and research in this area.  Undergraduates in the Department of Politics, for example, are able to specialise in analysing the corruption challenge via bespoke modules. That can include analysing corruption in international business or more putting more political types of corruption under the analytical microscope.

Three causal narratives about regulation and corruption

By Claire A. Dunlop, Professor of Politics and Public Policy at University of Exeter, UK and Claudio M. Radaelli, Professor of Public Policy at University College London, UK

What is the exact causal relationship between corruption in the public sector and regulation? Hundreds of studies have scrutinized this relationship. We end up with not just one, but three causal narratives: that regulation causes corruption but under certain conditions; that it is the quality of regulation to hinder corruption; and that anti-corruption regulation can aggravate the problem of corruption.

The first narrative is by far the most popular. It is corroborated by studies carried out mostly by economists – regulation of private market activities may not only be inefficient, but push companies and small business entities to pay bribes to avoid either compliance or administrative costs – or simply to get a permit that depends on the discretion of public authorities. Does it follow that de-regulation is always a good idea to curb corruption? It depends: for a start, we have an efficiency loss if we scrap regulation that generates net social benefits. Then in some cases even what apparently looks like the most benign form of de-regulation, such as de-regulating business starts-up, can facilitate corruption. This is the case when de-regulation facilitates the process of rent-extraction by ruling elites. It also depends on whether we are looking at small-scale corruption in rule-making or grand-scale regulation-induced corruption such as nationwide privatization plans or the attribution of licences to broadcast television.